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Abstract
A panel of 186 European banks is used for the period 1992-2004 to determine if banking behaviors,
induced by the capital adequacy constraint and the provisioning system, amplify credit uctuations. Our
nding is consistent with the bank capital channel hypothesis, which means that poorly capitalized banks
are constrained to expand credit. We also nd that loan loss provisions (LLP) made in order to cover
identied credit losses (non discretionary LLP) amplify credit uctuations. Indeed, non discretionary
LLP evolve cyclically. This leads to misevaluation of expected credit risk which a¤ect banks incentives
to grant new loans since lending costs are misstated. By contrast, LLP used for management objectives
(discretionary LLP) do not a¤ect credit uctuations. The ndings of our research are consistent with
the call for the implementation of a dynamic provisioning system in Europe.
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1 Introduction
Much concern has been recently expressed about factors explaining uctuations in bank lending. Central
banks, as well as banking regulators, are concerned since such factors could exacerbate the business cycle,
cause nancial instability and misallocate lending resources. The literature on uctuations in bank lending
is based on the work of Bernanke and Blinder (1988) who introduced the credit market equilibrium in a
textbook IS-LM model and analyzed the interaction between monetary policy and bank lending. A better
understanding of the economys response to a monetary policy shock requires therefore to consider a bank
lending channel (Bernanke and Gertler, 1995) which emphasizes the role of imperfections in the market for
bank debt. This hypothesis is empirically supported by Kashyap and Stein (1995, 2000) for American banks
and by Ehrmann et al. (2003) for European banks. Imperfections in the market for bank capital can also be
stressed to explain uctuations in bank lending. Van den Heuvel (2002) focuses on capital requirements and
denes a bank capital channel by which monetary policy can change the supply of bank loans through its
impact on bank equity. These two channels do not only operate through changes in monetary policy. They
are also relevant in explaining the impact of macroeconomic conditions and changes in banking regulation
on bank lending.
In this paper, we point out another factor which may amplify the cyclicality of bank lending: the
provisioning system. Provisioning rules and capital requirements are linked through the coverage of credit
risk: the conceptual framework of credit risk management supposes that expected losses have to be covered
by loan loss provisions while unexpected losses have to be covered by bank capital. While regulatory
constraint explicitly links the expansion of bank lending with bank capital, such a constraint does not exist
on provisioning rules. However, loan loss provisions have a direct impact on banks prot. An underestimated
expected credit risk could reinforce banks incentives to grant new loans since lending costs are understated.
In addition, increases in loan loss provisions due to deterioration in loan portfolio quality can lead to a
decrease in banks capital if losses are too strong. Credit risk management without provisioning rules covering
expected credit risk may therefore have procyclical e¤ects. This concern is all the more important as banking
regulators and academic researchers focus mainly on capital requirements and tend to disregard provisioning
practices. Hence, in this paper we analyze if the evolution of loan loss provisions may explain changes in
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banks lending behavior over the business cycle.
The relationship between loan loss provisions and credit supply uctuations has to be cautiously analyzed
because loan loss provisions merge di¤erent information and behaviors. The literature distinguishes two
components1 . The rst one, called the non discretionary component, is made in order to cover expected
credit losses in a banks loan portfolio (Whalen, 1994; Beaver and Engel, 1996). This kind of provisioning
system is said to be backward-looking since banks mainly relate non discretionary provisions to identied
credit losses. During economic upswings, few credit losses are identied and the level of loan loss provisions
is low. During downturns, however, loan loss provisions increase because loan defaults are usually high
during this period. As a result, the non discretionary component is a driving force in the cyclicality of loan
loss provisions and leads to a misevaluation of expected credit losses. The expected credit risk appears as
soon as the loan is granted and not only during the downturn when the losses are nally identied. In
particular, Keeton (1999) and Jiménez and Saurina (2005) show that an increase in loan growth during an
expansionary phase leads to higher loan losses during the slowdown. Expected credit losses are therefore
under-provisioned during an upswing phase. Conversely, banks have to charge provisions too late during the
downturn. The cyclicality of loan loss provisions directly a¤ect bank prots and bank capital which could
inuence the banks incentive to grant new loans and increase the cyclicality of its lending.
The second component, called the discretionary component, is due to the utilization of loan loss provisions
for management objectives. At least three di¤erent discretionary actions can be distinguished (Liu et al.,
1997; Ahmed et al., 1999; Lobo and Yang, 2001). The rst one is the income smoothing behavior. Banks
have incentives to smooth earnings over time. When earnings are expected to be low, loan loss provisions are
deliberately understated to mitigate adverse e¤ects of other factors on earnings. On the other hand, when
earnings are unusually high, banks choose discretionary income-reducing accruals. Thus, under the income-
smoothing behavior, banks choose accruals to minimize the variance of reported earnings. This implies that
loan loss provisions increase during an expansionary phase and decrease during a recession phase. The two
other discretionary actions are concerned with capital management and signaling. With regard to capital
1Accounting practices distinguish specic provisions and general provisions (Cortavaria et al., 2000). Specic provisions are
dened by specic accounting rules. They depend on identied credit losses and they will increase specic loan loss reserves
which are deducted from assets. General provisions have to cope with expected losses and will be added to general loan loss
reserves on liabilities, but banks do not implement rigorous and statistical methods to compute them. Consequently, general
provisions depend partially on expansion of total loans and they are manipulated by discretionary behaviors of bank managers.
3
management, capital-constrained banks can use discretionary accruals to achieve regulatory-capital targets.
General and specic provisions reduce Tier 1 capital via their e¤ect on earnings and then poorly capitalized
banks could be less willing to make loan loss provisions However, general provisions are also included as
components of Tier 2 capital and deduced from risk-weighted assets2 . An increase in general provisions may
actually increase the regulatory capital, especially if the increase in Tier 2 is larger than the decrease in Tier 1
capital. To the extent that such discretionary behavior increases regulatory capital without a corresponding
reduction in risk of insolvency, it constitutes a regulatory capital arbitrage. The last discretionary behavior
occurs when banks use loan loss provisions to signal their nancial strength. The bank manager can signal
that the earning power of the bank is strong enough to absorb future potential losses by increasing current
loan loss provisions.
The objective of this paper is to analyze the e¤ect of the provisioning system on uctuations in bank
lending in Europe. In particular, we attempt to determine if loan loss provisions amplify the credit cycle.
Using a panel of European banks for the period 1992-2004, we estimate the non discretionary and discre-
tionary components of loan loss provisions in order to individually isolate their impact on banks lending.
The concern about the impact of loan loss provisions on credit cycle is particularly relevant for the debate
between nancial supervisors and accounting authorities about the reform in bank provisioning systems.
The current provisioning system in Europe is backward-looking (excluding Spain and Portugal since recent
years) and such a system may amplify the cyclicality of bank lending. In recent years, there have been calls
(Trichet, 2000; Poveda, 2000; Crockett, 2000 and Borio et al., 2001) for more forward-looking provisioning
decisions to mitigate the potential problem that may arise from the cyclicality of lending and bank prof-
itability. But there is no consensus about the way in which this should be achieved: dynamic provisioning3
2General provisions can increase loan loss reserves of up to 1.25% of risk weighted assets, the excess will be deducted from
Tier1.
3With a statistical or dynamic provisioning system, general and specic provisions are created continuously in the traditional
manner. General provisions are established as usual to cover expected losses as a given proportion of the total loan portfolio,
which are, however, not connected with direct assets and are for unspecied losses. Specic provisions are created to cover the
expected impairment of assets based on problem loans. In addition to these provisions, the statistical provision is formed with
purpose of anticipating risks arising from changes in business cycles for each risk category. The statistical provision records
the expected losses connected with the initial portfolio in a way that total provisions (specic, general and statistical) created
over the years are smoothed. The statistical provision increases in periods of economic growth, complementing net specic
provisions, which are rather low in these periods compared to total loans. Such a system was established in Spain, Portugal
and Australia. For a more detailed discussion on this issue, see Fernandez de Lis et al. (2001), Borio et al. (2001) and Mann
and Michael (2002).
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promotes banking stability whereas Full Fair Value Accounting4 (FFVA) promotes market discipline.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on bank behavior
and procyclicality. Section 3 reports the empirical methodology employed to di¤erentiate the discretionary
and non discretionary components of loan loss provisions. Section 4 presents estimates of the impact of
provisioning practices on credit uctuations. Section 5 discusses the credit cycle and dynamic provisioning
practices. Concluding remarks are presented in the nal section.
2 Related literature on bank behavior and procyclicality
The literature which analyzes uctuations in bank lending behavior provides some empirical evidence of
cyclicality. Asea and Blomberg (1998), using US data from 1977 to 1993, show that bank lending evolves
cyclically, a¤ecting aggregate economic activity. In addition, Peek et al. (2003) and Lown and Morgan (2006)
clearly identify the e¤ects of loan supply on uctuations in credit and GDP which supports the existence of
the bank lending channel5 .
Bikker (2004), for a panel of 26 OECD countries over the period 1979-1999, nds that lending at a
macroeconomic level is strongly dependent on demand factors, measured by cyclical variables such as real
GDP growth, ination, unemployment and real money supply. However, such macroeconomic approach
understates the role played by bank characteristics. This is because of the identication problem; it is di¢cult
to separate the role of loan demand from that of loan supply. This di¢culty has prompted researchers to focus
on microeconomic panel data to explore some of the cross-sectional implications of the bank lending view.
Much concern focused on the impact of monetary policy. The responses of banks to changes in monetary
policy may di¤er, depending on their characteristics. The idea behind this is that some types of banks are
more capable than others to o¤set a monetary policy shock. Indeed, changes in the money market rate a¤ect
4Full fair value accounting tries to approximate as closely as possible the value that the asset would have if it were traded on
the market. This implies that the value of a banks problem assets will fall immediately, in contrast with historical accounting
where banks have to make reserves for the di¤erence between the book value and the actual value. One of the benets of fair
value accounting is that it o¤ers better information to investors and supervisors. However, the frequent changes in the value of
assets exposed to market price uctuations tend to amplify capital volatility and thus lending cycles. See Jackson and Lodge
(2000) and the Joint Working Group Standard Setters (2000) for an overview of the debate on fair value accounting.
5We underline interactions between the credit cycle and the business cycle for di¤erent European countries over the period
1980-2004 using Granger causality tests and comtemporaneous correlations. The results are not presented in the paper but are
available from the authors upon request.
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the cost of funding but this has a limited e¤ect on lending when banks can easily raise non-deposit funding
or when banks own a bu¤er of liquid assets. Kashyap and Stein (1995) originally proposed a reduced form
dynamic equation for bank loans using a panel of American banks over the period 1976-1992. Their ndings
are consistent with the bank lending channel view and show that loan growth of large banks and small banks
respond di¤erently to a monetary policy shock. Other studies on American banks, following the approach
of Kashyap and Stein (1995), nd that the impact of the bank lending channel is also greater for banks with
fewer liquid assets and less capital (Kashyap and Stein, 2000; Kishan and Opiela, 2000). The bank lending
view is relevant for European banks as well (Altunbas et al., 2002; Ehrmann et al 2003) even if studies on
the role of banks capital display mixed results. Individual country estimates can give more conclusive results
(see Gambacorta and Mistrulli (2004) and Gambacorta (2005) for the Italian case).
The studies mentioned above point out a bank lending channel based on imperfections in the market
for bank debt. Imperfections in the market for bank equity are also stressed to explain the impact of bank
capital on lending and then to dene a bank capital channel (Van den Heuvel, 2002). The bank capital
channel assumes a maturity mismatch between assets and liabilities. An increase in the money market rate
is therefore supposed to a¤ect more strongly interest rates on banks liabilities than interest rates on banks
assets. Consequently, the increase in the money market rate implies a reduction in a bank prot and therefore
in the banks capital. Since issuing equity is costly and banks have to meet capital requirements, a monetary
policy shock can a¤ect bank lending. Van den Heuvel (2002) shows that the bank capital channel concerns
all low-capitalized banks and not only banks with capital binding constraint. Theoretical investigations
(Chami and Cosimano, 2001; Furne, 2001 and Zicchino, 2005) also emphasized the role of macroeconomic
conditions and changes in banking regulation to explain the impact of capital requirements on bank lending.
The bank capital channel is consistent with empirical ndings related to the 1990-1992 "credit crunch"
in the United States. These studies focus directly on the impact of capital requirements on bank lending
and try to assess whether there was a "capital crunch" caused by increased capital requirements or if more
stringent regulatory practices occurred at the beginning of the 1990s6 . Bernanke and Lown (1991) nd a
positive correlation between loan growth and changes in bank capital during 1990-1991 while Hancock and
6The BIS risk-based capital standards began to phase in at the end of 1990 and were fully implemented in 1992.
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Wilcox (1998) and Peek and Rosengren (1995) detect a positive e¤ect of bank capital requirements on credit
growth during the same period. Brinkmann and Horwitz (1995) also nd a positive e¤ect on loan growth,
but only for large banks. Wagster (1999) shows that stricter supervision, which occurred during the period
1990-92 in Canada, UK and the USA, implies that less credits were extended to lower-risk investments such
as government bonds.
Misevaluation of credit risk over the business cycle represents another feature which may explain uctu-
ations in bank lending. In phases of economic boom, banks are inclined to take on greater risks, owing to
their basically positive anticipations as regards the course of the economy and future trends. By contrast,
banks are excessively pessimistic during cyclical downturns if they overstate credit risk. Disaster myopia
(Guttentag and Herring, 1984, 1986), herd behavior (Rajan, 1994) and the institutional memory hypothesis
(Berger and Udell, 2003) account for misevaluation of credit risk. Disaster myopia emphasizes that banks
tend over time to underestimate the probability of low-frequency shocks while herd behavior focuses on the
idea that banks management is obsessed with short-term concerns and perception of reputation. As for the
institutional memory hypothesis, it stresses that current loan o¢cers ease credit standards over time as the
previous loan bust is not remembered because of loan o¢cer turnover.
Backward-looking provisioning systems also contribute to the misevaluation of credit risk. Whalen (1994)
and Beaver and Engle (1996) identify a non discretionary component in loan loss provisions related to
contemporaneous problem loans. Besides, Laeven and Majnoni (2003) and Bikker and Metzemakers (2005)
show that provisioning behavior is related to the business cycle. These studies therefore highlight that the
ratio of loan loss provisions to total assets exhibit a strong cyclicality. This is notably documented for
France (Clerc et al., 2001), Austria (Arpa et al., 2001), Spain (Fernandez de Lis et al., 2001) and United
Kingdom (Pain, 2003). Expected credit losses are therefore understated during upswings and overstated
during downturns. A time-lag can notably be stressed between riskier loans which are granted during the
peak of the business cycle (Keeton, 1999; Jiménez and Saurina, 2005) and loan loss provisions which are
built up only during the next downturn according to backward-looking rules. This pattern is a major factor
in driving the cyclical nature of recorded bank prots and bank capital. In particular, Jordan et al. (2002)
emphasize that the cyclicality of loan loss provisions is reected in bank capital. As a result, provisioning
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rules in a backward-looking system can be seen as contributing to the overall cyclicality of the nancial
system and the macro-economy more generally (Borio et al., 2001).
Although the recent debate about whether current practices of provisioning are biased towards procyclical
bank behavior, there is no study to our knowledge which explicitly examines the impact of loan loss provisions
on bank lending. Shrieves and Dahl (2002) - analyzing the utilization of the discretionary accounting practice
of the Japanese banks during 1989-1996 - nd a negative and signicant relationship between loan loss
provisions and year-on-year change in total loans. This result is consistent with the hypothesis that loan
loss provisions inuence credit cycles. However, to test explicitly the impact of loan loss provisions on the
uctuations of bank lending, the discretionary component and the non discretionary component need to
be distinguished. Indeed, the cyclical behavior of non discretionary provisions should reinforce the cyclical
nature of bank lending. On the contrary, the discretionary component, through the income smoothing
behavior, may reduce the procyclicality of bank lending.
3 Estimation of the discretionary and non discretionary compo-
nents of loan loss provisions
To test the impact of loan loss provisions (LLP) on uctuations in bank lending, we need to estimate
the discretionary and the non discretionary components of LLP. We use a methodology similar to the one
developed by Ahmed et al. (1999).
3.1 Data and descriptive statistics
We use a sample consisting of an unbalanced panel of annual report data from 1992 to 2004 for a set
of European commercial and cooperative banks7 established in 15 European countries: Austria, Belgium,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, United Kingdom (see Appendix, Table A1). The bank data used for the estimates come from
7We choose a sample of commercial and cooperatives banks to workon an harmonized set of banks. We do not exclude from
our sample banks involved in mergers or acquisitions. Nervetheless, few banks present a structural break in the balance sheet:
less than 20 banks present a variation of total asset over the period greater than 20% (the sample mean of the variation of total
asset is 10.58%).
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Bankscope Fitch IBCA8 . A majority of banks do not give information on some variables needed by this study
(especially non performing loans and total capital ratio). Also we delete banks with less than ve years of
time series observations. Moreover, we exclude outliers by eliminating the extreme bank/year observations
when a variable present extreme values 9 . The nal sample consists of 186 European banks out of the 2
513 available at the beginning (see Table A1 in the appendix for details). However, our unbalanced sample
represents a signicant part of total loans available in Bankscope Fitch IBCA. The average cover rates of
total loans are around 37% in 1992 and 54% in 2004 (see Appendix, Table A1).
Descriptive statistics show that deposits are the main resource (65.67%) and loans are the main banks
assets (58.53%) (see Appendix, Table A2). These assets seem carefully managed as mean ratios of LLP to
total assets and nonperforming loans to gross loans are respectively 0.41% and 5.08%. Furthermore, the
total capital ratio is 12.43%. Thus, on average, banks are well capitalized with su¢cient capital bu¤ers.
3.2 Modelling bank provisions
Empirical evidence and economic theory (Beaver and Engel, 1996; Liu et al., 1997; Ahmed et al., 1999; Lobo
and Yang, 2001) suggest a number of factors which may explain the choice of LLP. These may be grouped
into three classes.
3.2.1 Non discretionary behaviors
The non discretionary component of LLP reects expected losses but backward-looking rules based on
identied credit losses give a strong cyclicality to this component. The model includes three variables which
represent the risk of a banks portfolio. The ratio of non performing loans to gross loans at the end of the
year t (NPLit) and the rst di¤erence of NPLit (t+1=tNPLit = NPLit+1  NPLit) are good indicators
of the risk of default on banks loans. Hence, we expect a positive relationship between these two variables
and LLP. We also include the risk of default for the overall credit portfolio, measured by the ratio of loans
to total asset (Lit). The coe¢cient associated with this variable should also be positive.
8All the banks in our sample publish their annual nancial statements at the end of the calendar year.
9The outliers represent 125 banks of the banks excluded of our sample (5% approximately of the initial sample). Thus most
of the banks were deleted because we miss data about some variables.
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3.2.2 Discretionary behaviors
The discretionary component of LLP results from three di¤erent management objectives.
The income smoothing behavior
Under the income smoothing hypothesis, banks understate (overstate) LLP when earnings are expected
to be low (high) relative to that of other years (inter-temporal smoothing). If banks use LLP to smooth
earnings, then we would expect a positive relation between earnings before taxes and loan loss provisions
(ERit) and LLP. As the propensity to smooth income is higher for banks with good performance relative to
banks with moderate current performance, we introduce a dummy variable which takes the value of ERit for
banks with positive earnings before taxes and loan loss provisions and 0 otherwise (ER_Hit). We should
nd a positive coe¢cient for ER_Hit if there is non linearity in the relation between LLP and earnings.
The capital management behavior
Poorly capitalized banks can use LLP to manage regulatory capital. We compute the variable TCRLit
which takes the value of the total capital ratio (TCR) minus 8 and divided by 8 when observations for
bank i are in the rst quartile of TCR and 0 otherwise. A positive correlation between LLP and TCRLit
could be expected if poorly capitalized banks are less willing to make LLP (Shrieves and Dahl, 2002).
However, accounting relations could also inuence the relation between bank capital and loan loss provisions.
Regulatory capital is composed of Tier 1 - which includes equity and retained earnings - and Tier 2 - which
includes subordinated debt and loan loss allowances. LLP are therefore positively correlated to Tier 2 and
negatively to Tier 1. If regulatory capital variations are more related to retained earnings than loan loss
allowances, correlation should be negative between LLP and TCRLit
10 .
The signaling behavior
Banks can also use LLP to signal their nancial strength. Beaver et al. (1989) suggest that loan loss
provisions can indicate that "management perceives the earnings power of the bank to be su¢ciently strong
that it can withstand a hit to earnings in the form of additional loan loss provisions". If signaling is an
important incentive in choosing LLP, then we should observe a positive relation between LLP and changes
10We use in our study the total capital ratio (TCR = TIER1+TIER2) because a majority of banks do not give specic
information on their level of TIER 1 and TIER 2.
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in future earnings before taxes and LLP (Whalen, 1994; Ahmed et al., 1999). The variable SIGNit, dened
as the one-year-ahead changes of earnings before taxes and loan loss provisions (SIGNit = (ERit+1  
ERit)=0:5(TAt + TAt+1);where TA is the total asset), is computed to test the signaling hypothesis. A
positive correlation with LLP is expected.
3.2.3 Macroeconomic inuences on asset quality
The macroeconomic environment should a¤ect the ability of borrowers to repay banks assets. The private
sector wealth will vary with the economic cycle, so we introduce the annual growth rate of GDP, _yit. Some
studies have empirically studied the economic cycle as a determinant of loan loss provisions (see Pain (2003)
for UK banks, Fernandez de Lis et al. (2001) for the Spanish case, Cavallo and Majnoni (2001), Laeven
and Majnoni (2003) and Bikker and Metzemakers (2005)). They nd a signicant and negative impact on
provisions: loan losses increase (and hence LLP) when _yit decreases. Thus, we expected a negative sign for
the variable _yit.
3.2.4 Model specication
Equation (1) models the relationship between loan loss provisions and the explanatory variables dened
above:
LLPit = 0 + 1
(+)
LLPit 1 + 2
(+)
NPLit + 3
(+)
t=t+1NPLit + 4
(+)
Lit + 5
( )
_yit (1)
+6
(+)
ERit + 7
(+)
ER_Hit + 8
(+= )
TCRLit + 9
(+)
SIGNit + "it;
where LLPit is the ratio of loan loss provisions (specic provisions plus general provisions) to total assets at
the end of the year t for bank i. We introduce the lagged dependent variable as explanatory variable to take
into account a dynamic adjustment of LLPit. If banks adjust their provisions slowly to recognize potential
losses against loans following a default event, then provisions could be systematically related to each period.
The model accounts for the possibility that the use of discretionary LLP for one purpose is conditional on
the e¤ects of the other two motivations; this is done by jointly estimating the relationships between loan loss
provisions and income smoothing, capital management and signaling behaviors.
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Equation (1) is estimated to compute the non discretionary component (NDISCit) and the discretionary
component (DISCit) of LLP. We assume that these two components are linear functions of the variables
included in equation (1). Thus, the non discretionary component of LLP is estimated as the sum of the
products of its explanatory variable times the corresponding estimated coe¢cient from equation (1). The
same method is used to compute the discretionary component.
3.3 Empirical results
As we consider a dynamic adjustment of LLP, equation (1) is estimated with the generalized method of
moments (GMM) using rst di¤erences (Arellano and Bond, 1991) and orthogonal deviations (Arellano and
Bover, 1995). The results are reported in Table 1. This estimation is robust to heteroskedasticity and
autocorrelation. We also ensure that the correlations between exogenous variables are weak.
The coe¢cients on NPLit (2) and on t=t+1NPLit (3) are signicantly positive at the 1% level. This
result implies that the cyclical evolution of non performing loans inuences provisioning via the backward-
looking rules. Bank prots are therefore also inuenced by the cyclicality of identied credit losses via loan
loss provisions. The other variable introduced to assess the e¤ect of expected credit losses on LLP choices,
the ratio of loans to total asset Lit, is not signicant at the 10% level. The signicant and negative coe¢cient
for GDP growth (5) indicates that the macroeconomic situation is relevant, which strengthens the cyclical
behavior of LLP. Business cycle inuences nancial strength of rms and households and therefore is closely
related to problem loans. This implies not only an increase in specic provisions according to backward-
looking rules but also an increase in the general provisions as the GDP growth modies the credit exposure
of banks. The lagged dependent variable is also signicant at the 1% level, which suggests that banks adjust
their provisions gradually to recognize potential losses against loans.
Concerning the discretionary behaviors, our results show that poorly capitalized banks use LLP to manage
regulatory capital. Provisions of poorly capitalized banks vary directly with their surplus regulatory capital
(8>0). When regulatory capital surpluses of poorly capitalized banks are increasing, these banks can
increase loan loss provisions11 . Thus, poorly capitalized banks are less inclined in making LLP. The estimated
11To check for robustness, equation (1) was also ran with the variable total capital ratio (TCR). This variable is not signicant.
It means that only poorly capitalized banks use LLP to manage regulatory capital. Our other conclusions remain valid. These
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coe¢cient of the variable earnings before taxes and loan loss provisions (6) is signicant and negative. This
is not consistent with the hypothesis of an income smoothing behavior. On the contrary, banks reduce
loan loss provisions when earnings before taxes and loan loss provisions increase. This result emphasizes the
cyclicality in loan loss provisions already underscored by the non discretionary component since high earnings
are recorded during economic upswings. Beside, the variable ER_Hit, accounting for banks with a relatively
good performance, exhibits a positive and signicant coe¢cient (7). This result suggests a non linearity
in the relation between LLP and earnings. Banks with relatively good performances are more able to o¤set
the cyclicality of loan loss provisions. However, wald tests shows that the total impact (6+7) of earnings
on loan loss provisions remains negative and signicantly di¤erent from zero at the 5% level for banks with
a relatively good performance. With regard to the signaling behavior, banks may use discretionary LLP to
signal nancial strength. We nd that the coe¢cient on SIGNit (9) is positive and signicant, which is
consistent with the signaling hypothesis.
We use the estimates of equation (1) to compute the non discretionary (NDISC) and the discretionary
(DISC) components of LLP. It is assumed that these two components are linear functions of the di¤erent
variables included in equation (1). Thus, they are estimated as the sum of the products of its explanatory
variables times the corresponding estimated coe¢cients from equation (1). To check for robustness, we
compute di¤erent non discretionary and discretionary variables. The following three non discretionary
variables are computed for each of two methods of estimation (Arellano and Bond (1991) and Arellano and
Bover (1995))
NDISC1it = 1LLPit 1 + 2NPLit + 3t=t+1NPLit + 4Lit + 5 _yit; (2)
NDISC2it = 1LLPit 1 + 2NPLit + 3t=t+1NPLit + 5 _yit; (3)
NDISC3it = 1LLPit 1 + 2NPLit + 3t=t+1NPLit (4)
The variable NDISC1it includes all the variables which may explain NDISC as well as the the annual growth
rate of GDP ( _yit) which a¤ects the ability of borrowers to repay banks assets. The variable NDISC2it only
results are not presented in the paper but are available from the authors upon request.
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includes the signicant variables at the 10% level, which implies that the variable Lit is excluded compared
to NDISC1it. The third non discretionary variable (NDISC3it) excludes _yit and the variable Lit which is
not signicant at the 10% level. On the same way, two discretionary components are computed
DISC1it = 6ERit + 7ER_Hit + 8TCRLit + 9SIGNit (5)
DISC2it = 7ER_Hit + 9SIGNit: (6)
We consider the set of explanatory variables that are signicant to compute the rst discretionary variable,
DISC1it. For the second one, we only keep the variables that may smooth loan loss provisions: ER_Hit and
SIGNit. Income smoothing and signaling behaviors may o¤set the evolution of non discretionary provisions,
increasing loan loss reserves in good times. These provisions are accumulated when banks record strong
earnings and signal their strong earnings power. This occurs when banks are in a good nancial situation
and could positively a¤ect banks incentives to supply credits.
These discretionary and non discretionary variables are used to test the impact of provisioning behaviors
on bank loans uctuations.
4 Credit uctuations and provisioning practices
4.1 Specication of credit uctuations
An empirical model on bank lending uctuations is used to investigate macroeconomic implications of banks
procyclicality behavior. Most theoretical models on bank lending uctuations are drawn on Bernanke and
Blinder (1988) which originally introduced the credit market equilibrium in a textbook IS-LM model. How-
ever, empirical investigation with panel data calls several digressions. The empirical model has to t micro-
economic data and explain credit uctuations at the bank level. We use a methodology similar to Kashyap
and Stein (1995) who originally proposed a reduced form dynamic equation for bank loans. The model we
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estimate is written as
t 1=tLit = 0 + 1
(+)
t 2=t 1Lit 1 + 2
(+)
t 1=tDit + 3
(+)
_yit + 4
( )
iit + 5
( )
it + 6
(+)
TCRLit (7)
+7
( )
NDISCit + 8
( )
NDISCit Dum+ 9
(+=?)
DISCit + uit;
where t 1=tLit = (Lit   Lit 1)=0:5(TAit + TAit 1); TAit is the total asset; t 1=tDit is the growth rate
of deposits between year (t   1) and t; _yit is the GDP growth rate between the year (t   1) and t; iit is
the money market rate; it is the ination rate; TCRLit equals (total capital ratio-8)/8 when observations
for bank i are in the rst quartile of the total capital ratio (TCR) and 0 otherwise; NDISCit equals to
NDISC1it, NDISC2it or NDISC3it; DISCit equals to DISC1it or DISC2it; NDISCit  Dum equals
to the non discretionary variable (NDISC1it, NDISC2it or NDISC3it) multiplied by a dummy variable
which takes the value of 1 if the bank i is classied as poorly capitalized and 0 otherwise.
Three groups of variables are considered in the model. Firstly, three macroeconomic variables are intro-
duced. By including ination and GDP growth rate, the model accounts for the economic environment. We
should nd a positive sign for the GDP growth rate (3>0) since this variable is related to loan demand.
The annual ination rate should have a negative sign (5<0). The sign of the coe¢cient associated with the
money market rate should be negative (4<0) according to the e¤ect of a contractionary monetary policy
on bank lending.
Secondly, we consider bank specic variables. We expect a positive relationship between bank loans
uctuations and the growth rate of deposits between year (t   1) and t (2>0). Furthermore, one variable
is computed to take into account the bank capital channel, TCRLit. We should nd a positive sign for
the coe¢cient associated to TCRLit (6>0) since the regulatory capital requirements should represent a
constraint for poorly capitalized banks.
Finally, three variables are introduced to analyze the relationship between loan loss provisions and credit
supply uctuations. First, the non discretionary component of LLP (NDISCit) takes up reserves that banks
have to charge to o¤set their problem loans. This component of loan loss provisions is therefore expected to
reduce banks incentive to expand its credit supply (7<0) as it directly a¤ects prots. During a downturn,
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the overall return on lending is particularly a¤ected by the upsurge in loan loss provision resulting from
backward looking rules. We expect a negative coe¢cient whatever the non discretionary variable considered:
NDISC1it, NDISC2it or NDISC3it. Second, we introduce an interaction variable NDISCitDum (Dum
is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if the bank i is classied as poorly capitalized) to test if
there is non-linearity in the relation between non discretionary provisions and credit uctuations. Indeed the
e¤ect of non discretionary provisions on credit uctuations could be stronger for poorly capitalized banks
(8<0) since these banks cannot use a capital bu¤er to face an upsurge in loan losses. Third, we consider a
discretionary variable: DISC1it orDISC2it. The second one takes only into account discretionary behaviors
that may have a counterbalancing e¤ect on the cyclical evolution of non discretionary provisions: the income
smoothing and the signaling. Such provisions are made when banks are in a good nancial situation which
could positively a¤ect their ability to supply credits. We therefore expect a positive relationship between the
discretionary variable DISC2it and credit uctuations in equation (7) (9>0). The discretionary variable
DISC1it accounts for di¤erent behaviors. As the capital management behavior may have no clear e¤ect on
the cyclicality of bank lending and as the variable ERit does not have the expected sign, the sign of the
coe¢cient associated with the discretionary variable DISC1it is unknown.
4.2 Results
The estimation of equation (7) is performed with the generalized method of moments (GMM). This method is
relevant because the provisioning constraints (variablesNDISCit andDISCit) are built using the coe¢cients
from the regression of equation (1) and therefore contains measurement error. In addition, the lag of the
endogenous variable can lead to a simultaneity bias. These variables are therefore instrumented. Table 2
reports estimates obtained using the GMM estimator proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995) 12 . As we
have three di¤erent non discretionary variables (NDISC1it, NDISC2it and NDISC3it) and two di¤erent
discretionary variables (DISC1it and DISC2it), Table 2 displays results for six estimations
13 .
12Equation (7) is also estimated with the GMM estimator proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991). These results are similar
to the ones obtained with the GMM estimator of Arellano and Bover (1995). They are not presented in the paper but are
available from the author upon request.
13To check for robustness we also introduce in equation (7) the variation of total assets to take into account structural breaks
which may a¤ect the credit supply after a merger/acquisition. This variable, which is strongly correlated with the growth rate
of deposits, is positive and signicant for the six estimations. Overall, the vast majority of conclusions remain valid. These
results are not presented in the paper but are available from the authors upon request.
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As expected, macroeconomic variables are relevant in credit uctuations in all estimates. The coe¢cient
of the GDP growth rate (3) is signicant and positive whereas the coe¢cient of the ination rate (5) is
negative and signicant. The coe¢cient of the money market interest rate (4) is signicant and negative.
It means that monetary policy a¤ects bank lending. We also nd that banks use deposits to expand credit
as the coe¢cient 2 is positive and signicant.
With regard to the institutional constraints, we nd that the coe¢cient associated with the regulatory
capital requirements for poorly capitalized banks (6) is positive and signicant at the 1% level, which is
consistent with the bank capital channel. These banks are therefore constrained in their lending activities.
The provisioning rules also appear relevant in all estimates. Non discretionary loan loss provisions (7)
a¤ect credit uctuations negatively and signicantly at the 1% level (this result is also supported with
the Arellano and Bond (1991) estimator). Backward-looking provisioning rules therefore amplify credit
cycle: weak specic provisions during upswing phases encourage banks to expand credit whereas the sudden
identication of problem loans during downturns constrains banks to make provisions, which reduces their
incentive to supply new credits. As expected, poorly capitalized banks appear more constrained by the
provisioning system. Indeed, the coe¢cient associated by the interacting term NDISCit Dum is negative
and signicant. Jordan et al. (2002) emphasize that the cyclicality of loan loss provisions is reected in
bank capital. Indeed, bank capital can also be used to face expected credit losses following a sudden quality
deterioration of the loan portfolio. Capital requirements force poorly capitalized banks to shrink further
lending when non discretionary provisions increase.
Estimation of the e¤ect of discretionary provisions does not provide conclusive results. Coe¢cients as-
sociated with variable DISC1it (9) are negative and signicant at the 1% level
14 . Strong discretionary
provisions could therefore negatively a¤ect bank lending like non discretionary provisions but 9 is signif-
icantly weaker in absolute value than (7). Discretionary provisions are therefore less relevant than non
discretionary provision to explain bank lending behavior. In addition, DISC1it merges several discretionary
behaviors which makes di¢cult the interpretation of this result. Variable DISC2it takes only into account
provisions made for an income smoothing and/or a signaling purposes. This variable is signicant at the 1%
14However, the Arellano and Bond (1991) estimator gives similar result only with specication (7.1).
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level with the expected positive sign in specications (7.4) and (7.6) but it is not signicant at the 10% level
in specication (7.5)15 . Thus we do not nd a robust relation between the discretionary variable DISC2it
and credit uctuations. Moreover, even if the coe¢cient associated with variable DISC2it (9) is signicant
and positive, it is always signicantly weaker in absolute value than 7 and then its positive impact on bank
lending is limited. As a result, these discretionary provisions are made when banks are in a good nancial
situation but this provisioning behavior does not seem necessarily relevant to explain bank lending behavior.
5 Credit cycle and dynamic provisioning
The model estimated in this paper concerns bank lending uctuations. Long term and short term factors
cannot be properly isolated since panel data with a short time period are used. However, the accounting
constraint  linked to the evolution of non discretionary provisions  is relevant for short term uctuations.
This factor is driven by the cyclicality of identied credit losses as long as banks and regulators will not
implement a proper recognition of expected credit losses. Several other banks behaviors  for example,
disaster myopia (Guttentag and Herring, 1986), herd behavior (Rajan, 1994) or the institutional memory
hypothesis (Berger and Udell, 2003)  are more frequently highlighted to explain credit risk misevaluation
and the credit cycle. The supervision of these behaviors is di¢cult because they are mainly related to the
banks perception of the business cycle. In addition, competition in the credit market could strengthen
these behaviors. A conservative credit risk management strategy could implies earning returns under the
competitive level which could involve a loss of market share during an economic expansion. Banks could
therefore be incited to adopt a less conservative credit risk policy. Conversely, the implementation of a
forward-looking provisioning system could more easily reduce the credit cycle. Bank regulators can adopt
this system unilaterally.
A forward-looking provisioning system could break or more precisely o¤set the correlation between non
discretionary provisions and credit uctuations. This system consists of implementing statistical provisions
linking loan loss provisions with long term expected credit losses and not with contemporaneous problem
loans. Statistical provisions are computed as the di¤erence between expected credit losses and specic
15 In addition, the Arellano and Bond (1991) estimator gives similar result only with specication (7.6).
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provisions, i.e. they can either be positive or negative. Banks therefore have to estimate precisely their
expected credit losses per period using their own internal models or a standard approach developed by the
regulator (Fernandez de Lis et al, 2001). As a result, banks build up statistical provisions during upswing
phases  when contemporaneous problem loans and consequently specic provisions are weak compared to
total loans  and draw down these reserves during downturns. Over the full business cycle, loan loss
provisions are therefore smoothed.
Previous researches (Fernandez de Lis et al, 2001; Borio et al., 2001; Mann and Michael, 2002; Jiménez
and Saurina, 2005) emphasize the e¤ect of dynamic provisioning to smooth bank income and to stabilize
bank capital. The improvement in the evaluations of both credit risks and bank prots explain these
positive outcomes. Furthermore, our ndings show that provisioning also inuences credit uctuations. Our
estimations can be used to graphically illustrate (Figure 1) the relevance of backward-looking provisioning
practices to amplify credit uctuations. We represent the situation of poorly capitalized banks because
estimations showed (with the variable NDISCit  Dum) that their lending behavior is more inuenced
by their provisioning behavior and also because we would like to represent the average e¤ect of TCRLit on
credit uctuations. Figure 1 displays annual averages of credit uctuations (t 1=tLit) for poorly capitalized
banks. Credit uctuations are consistently positive on average from 1996 to 200316 . They are particularly
strong in 1999 and 2000, respectively at 10.33% and 10.93%. Figure 1 also shows annual growth rate of credit
uctuations dened as ((t 1=tLit   t 2=t 1Lit 1)=t 2=t 1Lit 1), i.e. the speed of credit uctuations.
The growth rate of credit uctuations records numerous swings, which is consistent with the occurrence
of a credit cycle. From 1997 to 2000, credit uctuations are increasing which leads to positive growth
rates of credit uctuations in 1998, 1999 and 2000 (respectively 24 %, 57% and 6%) and represents the
upswing phase of the cycle. This cycle peaks in 2000 and then slowdowns in 2001 and 2002. Growth rates
of credit uctuations are therefore negative in 2001 and 2002 (respectively -36% and -2%). In 2003, the
growth rate of credit uctuations is positive again (21%). The growth rate of credit uctuations is broken
down into several variables according to equation (7). We only represent on Figure 1 annual contributions of
deposits uctuations (t 1=tDit), GDP growth rate ( _yit), total capital ratio (TCRLit) and non discretionary
16Figure 1 does not consider years 1994 and 1995 because few poorly capitalized banks provide data for the period 1993-1995.
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provisions (NDISCit) to the growth rate of credit uctuations. Contributions of deposits uctuations are
the main factor explaining the growth rate of credit uctuations. In particular, they have a strong and
positive contribution in 1999 (27%)17 during the upswing phase and a negative one in 2001 (-12%) during
the slowdown. Contributions of the GDP growth rate and non discretionary provisions are procyclical. These
two variables have positive contributions during the upswing phase. In 1998, 1999 and 2000 contributions
of the GDP growth rate are respectively 4%, 2%, 8% and contributions of non discretionary provisions are
respectively 10%, 3% and 5%. In 2001, the average GDP growth rate falls from 3.57% to 1.77%, which
explains the strong contribution of the GDP growth rate (-17%) to the slowdown of credit uctuations.
Non discretionary provisions have a weak negative contribution to the slowdown (-3% in 2001) which means
that few credit losses had been identied during the slowdown. In 2003, the positive growth rate of credit
uctuations (21%) is particularly supported by the contribution of non discressionary provisions (9%) whereas
contributions of other factors are closed to zero. Figure 1 shows therefore that non discretionary provisions,
as the GDP growth rate, contribute to amplify credit uctuations. Figure 1 also points out that poorly
capitalized banks are a¤ected by the regulatory capital constraint. In 1999, total capital ratio has a negative
contribution (-12%) to the strongly positive growth rate of credit uctuations (57%). A strong credit
expansion (ceterus paribus) leads to a fall in total capital ratio which reduces the ability of banks to expand
credits. In 1999, the growth rate of credit uctuations would have therefore been stronger without the
regulatory capital constraint, which means that this constraint helped to smooth the upswing phase of the
cycle. In 2001, a negative contribution of total capital ratio could have been expected because the slowdown
could have lead to a fall in banks equities. However, Figure 1 shows that the contribution of total capital ratio
is closed to zero (0.4%) in 2001. Finally, we point out that contributions of non discretionary provisions to
the growth rate of credit uctuations displayed on Figure 1 result directly from an unsatisfactory backward-
looking provisioning system. This factor is not the main source of credit uctuations, but it could be easily
removed from the credit cycle. Non discretionary provisions would be smoothed in a dynamic provisioning
system (Fernandez de Lis et al , 2001). This system could therefore remove the banks incentive to grant
17This gure and next gures have to be compared with the growth rates of credit uctuations. For example, in 1999, the
contribution of deposits uctuation is 27% and the growth rate of credit uctuations is 57%. Deposits uctuation explains
therefore around the half of the growth rate of credit uctuation as it is displayed on Figure 1.
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new loans when non dicretionnary provisions are decreasing, i.e. when the expected credit risk could be
underestimated.
Our research gets to the heart of the di¤erences in opinion between nancial supervisors and accounting
authorities. Over recent years, di¤erent approaches have been proposed to change both national and in-
ternational accounting standards18 in order to include more forward-looking practices. The Full Fair Value
Accounting (FFVA) suggests that all nancial instruments  including loans  should be measured at market
value. As a result, gains and losses should be recognized in the prot and loss account as soon as they are ex-
pected. A dynamic provisioning system represents the main alternative to take into account more cautiously
expected losses. Given the cyclicality of bank lending, our results support a dynamic provisioning system
as it provides a more satisfactory institutional arrangement. Indeed, FFVA is not appropriate to support
nancial stability. It can enhance the procyclical character of bank lending because immediate recognition
of unrealized value might reinforce the e¤ects of shocks (Enria, 2004). It also increases banks earnings and
regulatory capital volatilities (Barth et al., 1995) which can impact the volatility of banks balance sheets.
Moreover, FFVA could a¤ect the liquidity transformation role of banks and could reduce their contribution
to inter-temporal smoothing (Freixas and Tsomocos, 2004). Furthermore, FFVA does not adequately recog-
nize the specic nature of bank lending. It views banks as portfolio managers rather than as institutions
that solve informational problems19 . As a result, the banking industry and banking supervisor are opposed
to FFVA (Chisnall, 2000).
6 Conclusion
The purpose of this research was to determine if the current provisioning system in Europe amplies credit
uctuations. Using a panel of 186 European banks for the period 1992-2004, we empirically investigated the
e¤ect of LLP on bank lending uctuations. In the rst step, we analyzed whether the choice of LLP reects
identied credit losses (non discretionary LLP) and/or management objectives (discretionary LLP). Then,
in the second step, we examined the variables which have an e¤ect on bank credit uctuations.
18For a more detailed discussion of this issue, see Borio et al. (2001).
19This is because the market value of banks loan is di¢cult to dene due to the underlying special information which is only
available for banks (Berger et al., 1991).
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Our results show that macroeconomic variables are relevant to explain credit uctuations. We also nd
that poorly capitalized banks are constrained in their lending activities. With regards to the provisioning
rules, the results show that the non discretionary component of LLP amplies the credit cycle. During an
upswing, banks tend to underestimate expected credit risk and then reduce non discretionary LLP. Banks
incentives to grant new loans are therefore reinforced since lending costs are understated. Conversely, sudden
identication of problem loans during a downturn constrains banks to make non discretionary provisions,
which reduces their incentive to supply new credits. In addition, this e¤ect is stronger for poorly capitalized
banks since these banks cannot use a capital bu¤er to face an upsurge in loan losses. On the contrary, the
discretionary component of LLP does not seem relevant to explain credit uctuations.
Our ndings are consistent with the call for the implementation of a forward-looking principle in Europe
through a dynamic provisioning system as in Spain and Portugal. Such dynamic provisioning system will
require to modify accounting rules. The bank regulatory capital which incorporates general provisions up
to a ceiling would also need to be changed in order to solely cover unexpected losses. The adoption of the
dynamic provisioning system at the European level may imply to harmonize accounting and taxes rules
which are very di¤erent across countries.
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Table 1: Non discretionary and discretionary components of LLP(equation (1))
(1.1)
(Arellano-Bond)
(1.2)
(Arellano-Bover)
LLPit( 1)
(+)
0.2624a
(7.35)
0.2723a
(8.09)
NPLit
(+)
0.0261a
(2.65)
0.0248a
(2.94)
t=t+1NPLit
(+)
0.0009b
(2.12)
0.0011a
(2.75)
Lit
(+)
0.0029
(1.30)
0.0026
(1.31)
_yit
(-)
-0.0113a
(-2.53)
-0.0120a
(-2.88)
ERit
(+)
-0.3522a
(-11.78)
-0.3541a
(-12.73)
ER_Hit
(+)
0.2271a
(7.42)
0.2204a
(7.53)
TCRLit
(+)
0.4148a
(2.81)
0.4190a
(2.95)
SIGNit
(+)
0.0299c
(1.83)
0.0335b
(2.25)
J-stat 45.16 43.23
Obs. 739 739
Note: a, b and c indicate signicance respectively at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. t-statistics are corrected for
heteroskedasticity following Whites methodology.
Variable denitions: LLPit: ratio of loan loss provisions to total assets at the end of the year t; NPLit: ratio
of non performing loans to gross loans at the end of the year t; t=t+1NPLit: NPL growth rate between year t
and (t+1); Lit: ratio of loans to total assets at the end of the year t; _yit: GDP growth rate between the year (t-1)
and t; ERit: ratio of earnings before taxes and loan loss provisions to total asset; ER_Hit: take the value of ERit
for banks with positive earnings before taxes and loan loss provisions and 0 otherwise; TCRLit: (TCRit-8)/8 when
observations for bank i are in the rst quartile of the total capital ratio (TCR) and 0 otherwise; SIGNit: take the
value of the one-year-ahead change of ERit.
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Table 2: Bank loan uctuations (Arellano Bover (1995) estimator)
(7.1) (7.2) (7.3) (7.4) (7.5) (7.6)
t 1=tLit( 1)
(+)
0.0268a
(8.40)
0.0159a
(9.72)
0.0124a
(6.63)
0.0440a
(21.36)
0.0430a
(9.98)
0.0241a
(10.37)
t 1=tDit
(+)
0.2270a
(71.34)
0.2363a
(132.62)
0.2389a
(132.60)
0.2517a
(55.87)
0.2716a
(130.51)
0.2611a
(117.02)
_yit
(+)
0.9673a
(28.06)
0.9644a
(59.42)
1.099a
(49.85)
0.8865a
(50.23)
0.9329a
(28.61)
1.0406a
(86.82)
iit
(-)
-0.5383a
(-20.89)
-0.5050a
(-31.32)
-0.4860a
(-36.58)
-0.4955a
(-27.64)
-0.5414a
(-6.95)
-0.4172a
(-34.35)
it
(-)
-0.3903a
(-11.44)
-0.4525a
(-24.77)
-0.3814a
(-15.64)
-0.3830a
(-13.26)
-0.6597a
(-15.37)
-0.2993a
(-18.51)
TCRLit
(+)
0.1985a
(29.12)
0.1874a
(55.97)
0.2035a
(55.27)
0.2040a
(16.17)
0.2399a
(19.74)
0.2264a
(40.15)
NDISC1it
(-)
-0.0488a
(-8.14)
- -
-0.0526a
(-15.40)
- -
NDISC2it
(-)
-
-0.0683a
(-26.13)
- -
-0.0581a
(-10.02)
-
NDISC3it
(-)
- -
-0.0789a
(-25.19)
- -
-0.0872a
(-81.35)
NDISCit Dum
(-)
-0.0250a
(-8.04)
-0.0520a
(-27.36)
-0.0450a
(-21.51)
-0.0154a
(-2.58)
-0.0619a
(-5.38)
-0.0410a
(-8.26)
DISC1it
(?)
-0.0104a
(-4.71)
-0.0056a
(-4.16)
-0.0075a
(-6.56)
- - -
DISC2it
(+)
- - -
0.0189a
(6.47)
0.0088
(0.81)
0.0236a
(10.62)
J  stat 98.02 98.50 99.69 98.94 93.56 104.24
Obs. 556 556 556 556 556 556
Note: a, b and c indicate signicance respectively at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. t-statistics are corrected for
heteroskedasticity following Whites methodology.
Variable denitions: t 1=tLit: loans variation of bank i between years (t-1) and t / 0.5*(total assets of year
(t-1) + total assets of year t); t 1=tDit: growth rate of deposits between year (t-1) and t; _yit: GDP growth rate
between the year (t-1) and t; iit: money market rate; it: ination rate; TCRLit: (TCRit-8)/8 when observations
for bank i are in the rst quartile of the total capital ratio (TCR) and 0 otherwise; NDISC1it, NDISC2it and
NDISC3it: the three specications of the non discretionary component of LLP ; NDISCit*DumTCRLit: the non
discretionary component of LLP when observations for bank i are in the rst quartile of the total capital ratio
(TCR) and 0 otherwise; DISC1it and DISC2it: the two specications of the discretionary component of LLP .
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Figure 1: Contributions to the growth rate of credit uctuations
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Note: This Figure uses average values for poorly capitalized banks of variables used in equation (7) and
estimated coe¢cients of equation (7). Credit uctuations correspond to annual averges for poorly capital-
ized banks of the endogenous variable (t 1=tLit). The growth rate of credit uctuations is dened as:
(t 1=tLit t 2=t 1Lit 1)/t 2=t 1Lit 1. Deposits, GDP , TCRL and NDISC respectively represent the
contribution of deposits, GDP, total capital ratio and non discretionary provisions to the growth rate of credit
uctuations, computed as follow:
t 1=tLit t 2=t 1Lit 1
t 2=t 1Lit 1
=
t 1=tDit t 2=t 1Dit 1
t 2=t 1Dit 1


1
t 2=t 1Dit 1
t 2=t 1Lit 1
+ _yit  _yit 1_yit 1 

3
_yit 1
t 2=t 1Lit 1
+TCRLit TCRLit 1TCRLit 1 

6
TCRLit 1
t 2=t 1Lit 1
+NDISCit NDISCit 1NDISCit 1 
(
7
+
8
)NDISCit 1
t 2=t 1Lit 1
+uit
where uit is the change in credit uctuation explain by the other variables taken into account in equation (7).
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Appendix
Table A1: Country of origin of banks
Country
Number of banks*
available under
Bankscope Fitch
IBCA
Number of
banks retained
in our sample
Total loans of banks
retained in our
sample / Total loans
of banks available
under Bankscope
Fitch IBCA (%)
1992 2004
Austria 145 1 - 12.73
Belgium 81 2 - 37.72
Denmark 93 14 - 87.29
Finland 13 1 - 32.06
France 461 31 3.01 39.97
Germany 456 4 - 46.98
Greece 29 0 - -
Ireland 48 3 39.24 60.2
Italy 272 83 - 72.18
Luxembourg 147 0 - -
Netherlands 73 1 - -
Norway 21 6 12.09 30.45
Portugal 40 11 28.24 91.99
Spain 137 13 28.56 83.05
Sweden 30 6 97.66 93.56
Switzerland 270 1 - 39.56
UK 197 9 53.7 27.55
Total 2513 186 - -
Mean - - 37.50 53.95
* Commercial and cooperative banks are considered
.
Table A2: Descriptive statistics for European commercial and cooperative banks,
on average over the period 1992-2004.
L L D E NPL LLP TCR ROA
Mean 58:53 6:51 65:67 7:22 5:08 0:41 12:43 0:61
Max 97:89 48:02 92:32 75:84 29:02 3:76 39:32 3:09
Min 11:63  25:77 12:10 1:55 0:00  0:35 6:01  6:09
Std 16:25 7:75 14:56 4:43 4:37 0:36 4:26 0:54
Variable denitions: All variables are in percentage. L: loans/total assets; L: loans variation of bank i
between years (t-1) and t / 0.5*(total assets of year (t-1) + total assets of year t); D: deposits/total assets; E:
equity/total assets; NPL: non-performing loans/gross loans; LLP : loan loss provisions/total assets; TCR: total
capital ratio; ROA: return on asset.
28
